The media contest during the Iran–Iraq war:The failure of mediatized Shiʿism by Kalantari, Mohammad
1 
 
The Media Contest during the Iran-Iraq War:  
The Failure of Mediatised Shiʿ ism  
 
Abstract 
This article explains why Iran was unsuccessful in its efforts to persuade Shiʿi Iraqis to support Iran 
during the critical early years of the Iran-Iraq War. Analysis of Iranian and Iraqi framing communicated 
to that target population shows Iran failed due to both structural and cultural factors. Its media strategy 
lacked reach and variety and it misunderstood the cultural identity of Shiʿi Iraqis. The article makes use 
of original archive material of radio transcripts from 1981-83 as well as other primary sources and 
historical accounts. The research makes an original theoretical contribution by applying media contest 
theory to a military confrontation between two sovereign states, rather than between a state “authority” 
facing a non-state “challenger”. The findings have implications for considering how Iran today may 
communicate more effectively beyond its borders through regional media strategies and thus the 
viability of a mediatised Shiʿism.  
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The Iran-Iraq war was the longest inter-state war in modern history. Two states, with majority 
Shiʿi Muslims populations, were engulfed in an eight-year war which resulted in millions of 
casualties on both sides. The war soon evolved into a regional struggle between two 
revolutionary regimes within the broader region: the Baʿth party in Iraq advocating a pan- Arab 
ideology and the Islamic Republic of Iran propagating a Shiʿi theocracy. 
The idea that the Iran-Iraq war showcased the failure of Baʿth’s pan-Arabism and Iran’s 
Shiʿi-Islamism in the Middle East, is a long-lasting one in the literature (Massarrat 1993). Yet, 
few, if any, have tried to thoroughly examine the corresponding propaganda war and the role 
of the media in this failure.  
Baʿthists gained power in Iraq through a bloodless coup—titled by them as the ‘17 July 
Revolution’—in 1968. Their general ideology was formed around an interpretation of secular 
Arabism, advancing Arab unity, freedom, and socialism throughout the region. In Iran, the 
Shiʿi clerics had succeeded in assuming power in the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution, and 
wrote the new constitution which clearly sets the main facet of the new regime’s foreign policy 
as to ‘export the revolution’, to support the righteous struggles of the oppressed against the 
oppressors (Sick, 1995).  
The revolution in Iran became the most threatening for the Baʿthist regime in Iraq, the 
country with the longest border with Iran and hosting the second largest Shiʿi community in 
the region after Iran. Only months after the 1979 Revolution, inspired Iraqi Shiʿis made several 
attempts against Saddam Hussein. Time and again, their attempts failed. Thousands were 
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arrested and tortured, and many activists went into exile and found safe haven in a neighbouring 
country.  
In response to the execution of a high-ranking Shiʿi clerical figure in Iraq, Mohammad Baqir 
al-Sadr, Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, called upon Iraqis to follow the example of Iran’s 
revolution and to topple the Baʿthist regime (Aziz, 1993). Consequently, Saddam Hussein gave 
a speech condemning the activities of the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran for 
repressing Iranians and threatening neighbouring Arab countries. He continued by saying that 
Iranian leaders should acknowledge Arab citizens’ right of autonomy and should know that 
‘those who are in Arabistan [Khuzestan] are Arab, and the blood in their veins is Arab’ 
(Ahmadi, 2008: 124).  
Five months after this war of words, Iraq invaded Iran. Observers present different reasons 
for the war (Donovan, 2010, Karsh, 1989, Razoux, 2015).  But the mounting incitement of Iraqi 
Shiʿis by Iranian propaganda was certainly one of the key motive behind the decision of the 
‘secular’ Baʿthist  leadership to start the war (Bakhash, 2004: 21). In starting the war, Saddam 
had believed that the fall of the Islamic Republic would not only end or reduce the threat that 
Iran would be able to ‘export’ its ‘revolution’ to the Shiʿis of Iraq, but also this would 
consolidate his authority as the new Arab strongman of the region (Karsh, 1990). He believed 
that he could therefore kill two birds with one stone: suppress the Shiʿi identity, which was 
seemingly at odds with the Baʿthist ideology, and subsume the Arab identity of Iraqis as one 
nation.  
The war placed Iraqi Shiʿis at the forefront of the belligerents’ propaganda machines. And, 
it soon became clear that to win the war, the antagonists would need to win the hearts and 
minds of Shiʿi Iraqis. For Iraq, whose population includes Arabs, Kurds, and Turkoman ethnic 
groups, the very ‘Arab’ identity of the country is owed to the existence of its Shiʿi population 
(Al-Alawi, 2011); and, for Iran, at least, since its attempt to invade Iraqi territories (in May 
1982), the support of the majority-Shiʿi areas of southern Iraq and that of the city of Basra, was 
vital.   
Two years into the war, Iran, having gained the upper hand on the battleground by 
recapturing the city of Khorramshahr, advanced into Iraqi territories. This exacerbated the 
media war of the two hostile countries. When, in 1988, Iran was pushed to accept a cease fire, 
it became clear that the Achilles’ heel of the Iranian political elite was its misperception of the 
Iraqi Shiʿi community: above all else, they were defeated by their Iraqi co-religionists in the 
swamps of Basra.  
 
3 
 
Figure 1. Arabs in Iran and Shiʿis of Iraq 
 
 
Later statistics confirm that the Shiʿis of Iraq were more likely than other Iraqis to have died 
during the war (Blaydes, 2018: 81). In an interview with his CIA interrogator in 2005, Saddam 
clearly confirms the role of Iraqi Shiʿis in the war, saying: ‘[Iraq’s] Shiʿis are the ones who 
fought against Iran .... They were part of the victory’ (Nixon, 2016: 131). 
The aim of this paper is to explore the shortcomings of the mediatised Shiʿism employed by 
Iranians when they began offensive operations after 1982, by examining the media contest 
between Iran and Iraq during the war to attract Iraqi Shiʿi community. The paper will explain 
why the attempts of the Iranian media failed, and why the Iraqi Shiʿi soldiery did not defect 
but rather drove the Iraqi military machine until the war ended. The paper starts by proposing 
a theoretical framework based on Wolfsfeld’s Media Contest Theory (Wolfsfeld, 1997, 
Wolfsfeld, 2003). It then scrutinises Iran’s media authority, and the framing of Shiʿi ideology 
in radio broadcasting during the period between September 1981 and February 1983. This was 
the period in which Iran pushed Iraq’s army back to its pre-war position; when the stalemate 
that ensued, led to a five-year war of attrition which was ended when the belligerents signed a 
cease fire in August 1988. The third part presents an analysis of the media contest between the 
two countries. The fourth part of the paper examines what went wrong for the Iranian regime, 
focussing mainly on the cultural weaknesses of their media strategy. The paper concludes by 
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elucidating the theoretical findings and their contribution to one of the most influential conflicts 
in the recent history of the Middle East. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MEDIA CONTEST MODEL  
Media as a public sphere provides a communicative space in which ideas and ideals find public 
representation. There has been an ongoing debate in political communication over the extent 
to which media plays a role in shaping political outcomes. At one end of this debate one finds 
studies that attribute such power to news media which, it is argued, can ‘manufacture consent’ 
for elite policies (Robinson, 2001). At the other end of this debate, and of this radical 
categorisation, stand studies which argue that the socio-political landscape is more 
complicated, and which point to continuous contention and contestation within media 
representations (Cottle, 2006). Gadi Wolsfeld’s ‘media contest theory’ is one such study 
(Wolfsfeld, 1997, Wolfsfeld, 2003). It aims to reconcile contrasting claims concerning the 
power of media in shaping political outcomes by acknowledging the role of news media but, 
at the same time, emphasising that “politics comes first”. The theory offers a promising 
foundation for studying the role of media in the Iran-Iraq war, and in probing the failure of 
mediatised Shiʿism. 
Mediatised Shiʿism refers to a form of Shiʿi Islam as a social and cultural institution, which 
has influenced by media (Hjarvard, 2011). There is no doubt that, in the contemporary Middle 
East, the changing authority of political Shiʿism is being influenced by, among other factors, 
general processes of mediatisation. With the rise of Ayatollahs in Iran in 1979, the local media 
began to propagate and enforce changes in culture and institutions and promote so-called 
“revolutionary cultures”. Soon, Iran’s new leaders decided to promote this call throughout the 
region and the Muslim world. A sense of mediatised (Shiʿi) Islam, which was revolutionary, 
anti-imperialist, and anti-autocratic began to gain traction among communities in the Middle 
East as early as the 1980’s. At the heart of this process were the media outlets of Iran and its 
affiliates. When the war started, the mediatisation of a so-called active “transnational Shiʿism” 
in the region was at a very early stage. Nonetheless, as it directly engaged over sixty per cent 
of the world’s Shiʿi population, the Iran-Iraq war played a unique role in the formation of what 
today could be called the  mediatised Shiʿism in the Middle East (Miller, 2009).  
Recently, scholars of media and political communications have tried to address, through the 
lens of mediatisation, fundamental questions about how media influences culture and society, 
politics, and foreign policy (Hjarvard, 2013, Esser and Strömbäck, 2014, Lundby, 2014, 
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Brommesson and Ekengren, 2017, Couldry and Hepp, 2017). This growing stream in the 
literature is concerned with the role that the media plays in long-term changes. As Hjarvard 
argues, mediatisation departs from the focus of tradtioional approaches which are 
predominantly concened with the influence of media on society, and on the media as an 
instrument that serves sociopolitical goals (Hjarvard, 2013: 2). It is concened to inquire  into 
how media interweaves with societies, how it changes patterns of social interactions, and of 
politics and of politicl practices. In this sense, mediatisasin theory works in tandem with what 
Wolfsfled calls ‘politics-media-politics’ (PMP). It ackonwledges a cycle whithin which 
variation in the political environments leads to variation in media conduct and, in turn, to 
further variation in the political environment (Wolfsfeld, 2013).   
During the Iran-Iraq war, political elites in both countries, with relatively high control over 
media outlets, employed different media, not only to broadcast their military successes and 
boost the morale of their soldiers on the battleground, but also to propagate their ideological 
policies on the ground. Exploring how each belligerent used the media, how each challenged 
the other to get more media representation, and how they framed their ideological message, 
will shed more light on this most tempestuous of periods in the modern history of the Middle 
East. 
Wolfsfeld’s underlying argument is that one cannot understand competition over news 
media without seeing it within the larger context of contests for political power. He proposes, 
therefore, that to understand a political contest between two parties– as between an established 
authority and a challenger – one must start by examining their competition for supportive media 
coverage. His empirical studies show the centrality of the political process in driving this 
contest (Wolfsfeld, 2003): it is policy/politics which influence the media and rarely the other 
way around. The initiation and protraction of the war by both Iraq and Iran was driven by the 
expansionist policies of these two revolutionary states. To that end, both tried to exploit the 
available media to justify their set policies. The belligerents had firm ideological and 
revolutionary standpoints and tried to use media, at least in part, as a tool in the service of 
propagating their ideologies. Wolfsfeld’s media contest theory also assumes that the 
antagonists’ contention within media representations has two dimensions: structural and 
cultural. While the former dimension implies contestation over access to the media, the latter 
dimension refers to the contestants’ battle over the meaning, by framing their ideological 
message, social values and norms (Wolfsfeld, 2003: 89). Framing here is understood as those 
central organising ideas, yet largely unspoken and unacknowledged, for making sense of 
relevant events and suggesting what is at stake for those reporting the events as well as people 
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who rely on their reports. Media contest theory tries to shed light on how the antagonists strive 
to utilise their ‘production assets’ to facilitate the creation of newsworthy information, first to 
attract more airtime and second to promote their media frames (Wolfsfeld, 2004: 49).  
One of the more visible and audible characteristics of the eight-year conflict was the war of 
words—as happened in the spring of 1980—between the two leaders and policymakers 
conducted through Iranian and Iraqi official broadcast services. Over the course if eight years 
of war, and in line with strategies and realities on the ground, both countries continuously 
challenged each other, using different media, not only to mobilise their soldiers and boost their 
morale on the battlefield, but also to address the other’s public sphere by broadcasting their 
revolutionary ideologies beyond their own borders. This contest between authority and 
challenger is depicted in Figure 2 below. In this study and during the period under 
investigation, the authority is Iran because it is on the offensive, and the challenger is Iraq, 
which seeks to disrupt Iranian attempts to use media to influence Shiʿis inhabiting the Iraqi 
public sphere. 
 
Figure 2. The theoretical framework 
 
To this end, what served the ideology of Iranian political elites was to target the Shiʿis of Iraq 
who conformed to their reading of Islamism. In this, Iranians were well aware of the power of 
news media, and their weakness at least at the outset of the conflict. Khomeini admitted the 
superiority of Iraq’s media warfare in early 1981, in an address to personnel and managers of 
the Islamic Republic of Iranian Broadcasting Service:  
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You should be vigilant, as the media and propaganda [of the enemy] is 
more trenchant than its weapons in the battlefield. We should be afraid 
of their media campaign far more, and unfortunately, we have been 
weak here... I hope that with a more well-organised strategy, and 
harmony, you could neutralise the enemy’s stratagem (Khomeini, 2008, 
Vol XVI: 336).  
 
Eventually, the contest over the media became one of the main facets of the war. The focus of 
this paper, however, is on one side of this competition: how Iran employed its production assets 
to mediatise its politics during the war in order to target the Shiʿis of Iraq. Media contest theory 
provides a useful theoretical framework for this analysis. This study develops the PMP model 
in a case where Media is not independent of Politics, as it is state-sponsored. However, Politics 
still runs into problems when Media becomes involved. It explore, why for reasons of poor 
framing, and lack of professional practices, analysis of the Media part of the cycle illuminates 
problems in communication, and then reinforces the problems at the political level when we 
move through time to the second Politics. By examining a case where PMP are not entirely 
discrete units of analysis in a political sense would expand the empirical boundaries of the 
media contest model.  
 
CASE SELECTION, DATA AND METHODS 
The timeframe which this study covers is the eighteen months from September 1981 to 
February 1983. During this period—as Table 1 indicates, below— Iranian forces were able to 
begin a series of offensives against Iraq, first in order to recapture the territory which had been 
occupied since the start of the war, and then to invade Iraqi territories. For nearly eighteen 
months, and up until the time when the war reached a deadlock, Tehran became an authority 
in its media contest against the challenger Baghdad. In the course of the dramatic changes that 
occurred during the war, the Iranian elites sought to use their propaganda machine in order to 
enable their military machine to advance into majority Shiʿi territories in southern Iraq.  
In general, from the outset, the war was fought not only on the battlefield, but also on 
television screens and most notably on the radio (Khoury, 2013: 87). In this media contest, to 
broadcast their message beyond their own borders, Iran and Iraq relied mainly on the medium 
with the farthest reach: the radio.  
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Table 1. Iran-Iraq war: a brief chronology 
 
During the second phase of the war, Iran not only used radio broadcasts to justify their stance 
in the war and to encourage soldiers on the battlefield, but also to propagate its ideological 
views among Iraqis (Khoury, 2013: 62). For its part, Baʿthist Iraq sought to challenge the media 
attack orchestrated by its enemy.  
Radio broadcasting has played a major part in wars since the early twentieth century 
(Pinkerton and Dodds, 2009). For decades, radio has played a critical role in political 
communication across the globe. And the Iran-Iraq war occurred during the period known as 
the ‘radio-age’ in the region (Horten, 2002: 1). Cheap and easily accessible, both in Iran and in 
the Arab world, radio became the primary medium for those interested in following news of 
coups, wars and revolutions in the region. Before the start of the war, Iran and Iraq had each 
had Arabic and Farsi services, and both countries used these to broadcast state policy both 
internally and externally.  
The data for this paper is gathered from broadcasting of ‘Voice of Tehran in Arabic’ 
(VoTA), which had been established before the revolution to promote good relations between 
Iran and neighbouring Arab countries (Boyd, 1997), and Iraqi radio broadcasts of ‘Voice of the 
Masses’ (VoM), which was the most politically-oriented radio station in Iraq. VoM was 
broadcast exclusively in Arabic, and was intended for the broader Arab world, as well as for 
domestic consumption (Boyd, 1982). The methodology which this paper employs to study 
Iran’s radio framing, involves a thorough reading of available radio transcripts of VoTA and 
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VoM between September 1981 and February 1983, documented by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS).1 Active from 1941 to 1996, FBIS is the largest provider of the 
open-source intelligence (OSINT) in the US government (Mercado, 2009). It acted as the 
government’s primary instrument for collecting, translating, analysing, and disseminating 
open-source media including radio, television, press agencies, and newspapers.2 
In addition to FBIS database—since the public sphere targeted by both Iran and Iraq during 
this period was mainly the Arab Shiʿis in southern Iraq—other mediums used by Iraq to 
challenge the media authority of Iran (including TV news, daily newspapers) have also been 
examined. This mainly includes analysis of the transcripts and other media focuses on news 
framing of the opponent’s leader(s), of soldiers, of societies, and of the conflict itself.3 This 
paper connects framing to the media strategies being deployed by each side during the period 
of analysis. In this way, as with Wolfsfeld’s studies, the analysis allows for an explanation of 
how political actors deployed media strategies and how structural and cultural factors 
constrained their efforts in ways that contributes directly to outcomes. 
 
IRAN’S MEDIA AUTHORITY AND THE CHALLENGER, IRAQ 
During the 18 months, between September 1981 and February 1983, Iranian troops began a 
series of military campaigns which led, first, to recapture of the port city of Khorramshahr from 
Iraq on 24 May 1982, and pushed Iraqi forces back to their pre-war positions; and, then, to the 
entrance of Iranian troops into Iraqi territories with the launch of an offensive operation, ‘the 
blessed Ramadan’,  in July 1982 (Razoux, 2015: 223). The Iraqi leadership was soon forced to 
admit that it was on the defensive for the first time since the start of the war (Marashi and 
Salama, 2008: 140). Iranians were consistently attacking all along the border opposite the city 
of Basra, hoping for the collapse of the Iraqi army, and to spark a coup against Saddam Hussein, 
and trigger a Shiʿi uprising against the Baʿthists. This was the overarching political strategy 
which defined the media contest between Iran, the media authority, and Iraq, the media 
challenger, and initiated through Iranian Arabic radio broadcasts during this period.   
 
1. This paper has surveyed the database available at the Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
(FBIS). For the mentioned period, almost 373 unique records from broadcastings of Tehran 
International Service in Arabic, and 148 records from Baghdad Voice of Masses are available. For 
access to the data base visit https://www.readex.com/?product=246    
2. For further information about FBIS and the scope of its open source media coverage, see Leetaru 
2010.  
3. On framing, see Al Nahed and Hammond 2018. 
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Iran had had an Arabic service for years before the Revolution. The Shah, who saw himself 
as the “gendarme of the Persian Gulf”, used the Arabic service to promote good relations with 
neighbouring Arab states. Proximity to the Arab world permitted medium-wave signals to 
reach the Arab public. By 1976, Iran had transmitted the largest number of Arabic-language 
radio programmes among non-Arab states in the region (Boyd, 1997). Nevertheless, the 
broadcasts of Iran’s Arabic radio station changed dramatically in the aftermath of the 
Revolution. The revolutionary regime had been entangled in internal factionalism, and lacked  
a coherent state media policy (Maddy-Weitzman, 1982). This, among other issues, resulted in 
a sharp drop in Iran’s Arabic programming right after the Revolution,  so that a total of only 
10.5 hours of programming was broadcast each week (Boyd, 1983). It took Iran almost ten 
years, a far longer period than its war with Iraq, to regain its pre-Revolution Arabic Radio 
airtime (see Table 2, below). On the other hand, Iraq, an Arab country, had numerous official 
Radio stations—including its Voice of the Masses station with twenty-two hours of 
broadcasting per day on both medium- and short-wave transmitters. It also had one official TV 
station, and dozens of daily newspapers intended for both domestic and Arab world 
consumption (Boyd, 1982). This shaped the structural dimension of the media contest between 
the two adversaries during the war.  
Iran’s media authority during phase II of the war was easily challenged from a structural 
point of view, considering the amount of airtime used by Iraq’s Ministry of Information and its 
central media policies. Therefore, to win the media contest, Iran had to attain the upper hand 
in the cultural dimension of the media contest and hope that its bet that it could gain the support 
of the Shiʿi of Iraq would pay off. The cultural dimension of the media contest, as Wolfsfeld 
reiterates, involved persistent interpretation and reinforcement of shared norms and beliefs and 
outlooks on the situation (Wolfsfeld, 2003). Therefore, Iran had to gain the support of Iraqi 
Shiʿis not only when it drove the Iraqi armed forces out of its territories, but also, and most 
importantly, when it decided to enter Iraq with the aim of toppling the regime of Saddam.   
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Table 2. Hours/Week radio broadcasting in Arabic (Boyd, 1997) 
 
 
In September 1981, Iranian forces succeeded in ending the Iraqi siege of Abadan and were 
advancing to recapture the city of Khorramshahr. This was the first major victory for Iran since 
the start of the war, and it officially put an end to Iraqi offensives (Razoux, 2015: 181). As 
Iraqi forces were retreating, Iran mounted a propaganda campaign designed to demoralise the 
enemy. In the midst of the Iranian offensive to push Iraq out of  Khorramshahr, the VoTA made 
the following announcement:  
 
The coming weeks will be decisive on the front. Iran will have no 
alternative except to continue fighting so long as the enemy persists in 
his illusion and persists in his usurpation of Iran’s sovereignity. The fate 
of every Iraqi soldier was defined by the battles fought by the soldiers 
of Islam. He faces three possibilities: he will fall in the hands of Islam’s 
forces; he will be killed in fighting, his body burned and he will be prey 
for the beasts of the wasteland; or he will flee from the battlefield and 
thus will be entangled in the web of the Saddamist regime and then will 
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be killed and his body sent to his family with the word ‘traitor’ written 
on it.4  
 
Iranian media was very careful to make a distinction in its framing of the enemy’s forces. In 
order to prevent fully alienating the Iraqi soldiers—the majority of whom were Shiʿis— VoTA 
constantly used labels such as ‘Saddamists’ or ‘Baʿthists’ to describe their enemy. By late 1981 
and early 1982, as Iraq was retreating from Iranian territories it had previously occupied, 
Saddam occasionally used radio broadcasting to justify that the conflict had been started by 
Iraq, not out of ‘desire for aggression, but in reply to ‘Iranian aggression’.5   
From the start, the main concern of Iraqi rulers was the so-called expansionist aspirations of 
Iran’s Ayatollahs to extend its influence over the Shiʿi community in Iraq. As Iranian forces 
advanced on the ground, and the Iranian propaganda machine was roaring, Saddam addressed 
Iraqis in a live broadcast from the Shiʿis holiest city of Najaf, stating:   
 
[The enemy] believe that many Iraqi cities might incline their heads so 
the Tehran rulers could put on the noose of subservience. They believe 
that Najaf cold be part of Iran… Najaf is Iraq, the territory and people 
of Najaf are Arab.6 
 
In this way, he was invoking the Arab identity of Iraqi Shiʿis and warning them of the threat of 
subjugation at the hand of Iranians, should Iraq lose the war. This was something that Iranian 
media framing did not shy away from. For example, VoTA, in this call to Iraqis to rise against 
Saddam, stated that  
 
We call on you to actively participate in liberating your country and 
establish the government of God’s justice under the Imam al-Ummah, 
Khomeini. This government will ensure happiness for all the world’s 
oppressed.7  
 
Iranian forces finally managed to recapture Khorramshahr on 24 May 1982. As they were 
clearing the city of Iraqis, this was what a jubilant VoTA announced:  
 
 
4 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Report, Near East and South Asia, No. 
GF30711; Tehran International Service in Arabic (VoTA), 3 December 1981. 
5 FBIS Daily Report, No. JN061809, Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic (VoM), 6 January 
1982.  
6 FBIS Daily Report, No. JN242141, VoM, 24 February 1982.  
7 FBIS Daily Report, No. GF222014, VoTA, 22 March 1982.  
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Oh, nation of Mohammad; a decisive round in the conflict between 
Islam and infidelity has ended with the victory of great Islam and the 
defeat of infidelity, and Satan and his surrogates. The city of 
Khorramshahr has been liberated…Oh Muslims everywhere; Always 
follow reports of the victories forged by the soldiers of Islam… spread 
the news of these victories…Oh Muslim people of the region; The 
stooges will try to make you believe that Islam is a threat to you…The 
Islamic Republic is the state of the Quran, and the state of God’s 
messenger, therefore it protects every Muslims and does not inflict any 
harm on any Muslim...Oh Muslim people of Iraq; It is time for you to 
arise [against] the devil, Saddam. [He] must receive his just punishment. 
We only want the Quran’s rule and the banner of Islam. It is a struggle 
until the devil, all devils, are overthrown.8 
 
The announcement —which aimed to mark the start of a new phase for the triumphant Iranians 
and the demoralised and vanquished Iraqi soldiers— clearly manifests Iran’s media framing in 
its contest with the media framing of Iraq. First and foremost, it portrays Muslim Iranian forces 
as the ultimate ‘good’ people fighting against all the devils of the world starting with Saddam’s 
regime. It also targeted three audiences, namely Arab Muslims, Muslims in the Middle East, 
and Iraqi Muslims. It respectively transmitted three messages as well: first, that Muslims should 
rely on news coming from Iran and not rely on any other sources; second, that Iran does not 
aim to export its revolution to other countries in the region, therefore, the Middle Eastern 
Muslims should not see Iran as a threat; and third, that Muslims of Iraq should rebel against 
Saddam and topple him, albeit with the support of Iran.  
In the coming months, as data shows, this overarching media framing was persistent in 
VoTA reporting on the war and Iranian leaders’ commentaries. From this point on, in the 
emerging media contest Iran focused on the policy of ousting Saddam from power with the 
help of the Iraqi masses. To establish this policy and to appeal to the Iraqis and the broader 
Muslim world, Iran’s media authority used radio to communicate the idea that the Ba‘thists’ 
Saddam is an infidel, an American and Zionist puppet, and a tyrannical ruler. VoTA 
commentators, echoing Iranian leaders’ sermons and speeches, constantly broadcast that the 
only option for Saddam was either to escape from Iraq or to ‘commit suicide’ before devout 
Muslim Iraqis got their hands on him.9 
For their part, the Iraqi Baʿth, then on the defensive, pursued a policy of tarhib, of instilling 
terror, to challenge Iran’s authority and to protect the rule of Saddam (Marashi and Salama, 
 
8 FBIS Daily Report, No. GF241730, VoTA, 24 May 1982. 
9 See for example FBIS Daily Report, No. GF241931, VoTA, 24 May 1982. 
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2008: 149). The most prominent goal was to persuade Iraqis that they were not merely fighting 
to protect Saddam’s regime, but to prevent Arab-Muslim Iraq from succumbing to ‘non-
believer’ Iranian forces. For Saddam, himself, the most pressing concern was to impress on the 
Iraqi Shiʿis that their faith was by no mean mirrored by the Iranian interpretation of Shiʿism 
(Dawisha, 1999). 
Iraq employed a coherent and consistent media framing in the aftermath of its retreat from 
Khorramshahr to its pre-war positions. It did so to challenge Iran’s intensified media campaign 
and in order to maintain the morale of its soldiers and prevent the potential for a popular 
rebellion against Saddam to develop. In contrast to Iran, at the time, Iraq’s media strategy was 
centrally designed and implemented, by the Directorate of Political Guidance.10 This unit had 
the sole authority to produce media content targeting domestic and foreign audiences using all 
available means at the time, including various radio station, state TV stations, and daily 
newspapers (Khoury, 2013: 87).  
Iraq’s media framing, which was designed to challenge what the enemy was broadcasting, 
was moulded mainly around four principles. The first was presenting Saddam as the great Arab 
leader and the warden of Arab’s ‘eastern gate’, and to represent the war as an Arab-Persian 
affair which had nothing to do with Islam (Long, 2009: 25). The second was portraying a 
negative image of Iran and claiming that it was Iran’s expansionist ideology that had started 
the war (Bengio, 1998: 105). The third was to protest against those Arab states such as Libya 
and Syria that were supporting Iran (Maddy-Weitzman, 1982); and, the fourth, to expose Iran’s 
relations with the US and Israel (Woods et al., 2011b: 23).  
One day after the recapture of Khorramshahr, a VoM commentary announced that   
 
It is now definite that Iraq did not enter Iran out of greed for its 
territory… It was Iranians who whetted their appetite on Iraqi resources; 
who considered Iraq’s development and progress a threat to their dark 
dreams and hindrance to Zionist plans to keep all countries of the Arab 
homeland weak, backward and unable to exercise real 
sovereignty…Thus when they seized power, the Iranian rulers devoted 
themselves to the objective of humbling Iraq, dividing its people and 
territory, and turning it wholly, or partially, into a province in their 
planned empire…Iran could have spared the blood of hundreds of 
thousands of its sons. But the Iranian rulers refused [to end the war]. 
 
10 The army under the Baʿth regime, was more of an ideological body than a professional one. The 
party’s central leadership had taken a series of measures to strengthen its control over the army. The 
Directorate of Political Guidance, a body aiming to build up army morale, was one of those measures 
which was established in 1973. For further information see Bengio, 1998: 149.  
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They were driven by two motives: their intention not to give up their 
ambitions on Iraq and the Gulf countries and intervention by Zionist and 
pro-Zionist regimes, especially the Hafez al-Asad and al-Qaddhafi 
regimes, which encouraged Iranian rulers to not only continue the war, 
but also to hold on their ambitions.11 
 
The media contest intensified after Iran began its ‘Operation Blessed Ramadan’ offensive, 
advancing towards Basra. VoTA constantly broadcasted messages and announcements to 
reassure Iraqis that Iranian forces have benevolent intentions. On the other hand, the 
Directorate of Political Guidance office, aiming to counter rumours that Iraqi forces suffered 
from low morale and weak leadership, did not miss an opportunity to challenge Iran’s position 
(Marashi and Salama, 2008: 141). In this, Iraq as the media challenger began to frame the news 
about the war in ways that highlighted the hostility of Iranian forces, and Iran’s insincerity in 
the way that its broadcasting sought to portray, and thus to forge, realities on the ground. When 
Iran began shelling civilian areas around Basra, this became the main theme of Iraq’s 
challenging media strategy. Recent scholarship shows that the news of Iranian shelling, and 
Iraqi broadcasts concerning how Iraqi captives were treated in Iranian camps, triggered many 
Iraqis — mostly Shiʿis who feared that an Iranian invasion ‘would result in a violent disruption 
of their lives’ — to join the army and fight against Iran (Blaydes, 2018: 85).  This was 
consistent with the Baʿthist’s policy; while deserters faced dire consequences, Iraqi army 
officers, and the families of Iraqi martyrs, were subject to substantial material improvement 
(Blaydes, 2018: 102).12 
The Iranian leadership opted to enter Iraqi territories in order to end the threat of Saddam 
and expand their Islamic call. In this, they had assumed that they could gain Iraqi popular 
support (Dawisha, 1999). They also had counted on the support of those Shiʿi Iraqis who had 
been expelled from Iraq, some of whom had joined the dissident Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir 
al-Hakim (1939-2003) in forming, in Iran, the Supreme Assembly of  the Islamic Revolution 
in Iraq (Tripp, 1989: 67). In the aftermath of the recapture of Khorramshahr, VoTA reported 
on Hakim’s visit to an Iraqi prison camp in Tehran, and an address to Iraqis in which he sought 
to justify Iran’s having entered Iraq:   
 
11 FBIS Daily Report, No. JN251035, VoM, 25 May 1982. 
12 While Iranian forces were on the offensive, one major problem for the Iraqi army command was 
soldiers who deserted their posts. During this period, the Iraqi media occasionally broadcasted 
announcements of ‘the Revolution Command Council’ which confirmed that those ‘who committed the 
crime of desertion’ would face execution. For a sample news broadcast, see FBIS Daily Report, No. 
JN081329, VoM, 7 July1982. 
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[it] is the natural right of the Iranians to enter Iraqi territory to defend 
itself and to liberate the Muslim Iraqi people who have asked for 
assistance from the Imam of the nation and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran…  
 
Commenting on Hakim’s remarks, the radio announcer adds:  
 
[Hakim] appealed to all Muslims in the world to mobilise their efforts 
under the leadership of Imam Khomeini to fight against world infidelity. 
Our correspondent reports that following his address, an Iraqi prisoner 
expressed the Iraqi prisoners’ desire to take part in the war imposed by 
Saddam’s regime on the Islamic Republic.13 
 
While Iranian forces on the ground were facing great resistance from their co-religionist Iraqi 
Shiʿis, the VoTA had nothing to say other than encouraging Iraqis to fight against Saddam, and 
to expect that after him, ‘Imam Khomeini’ would become their leader. On the other hand, the 
challenging Iraqi media broadcast constantly that the Iraqi government would materially punish 
its defectors and reward its supporters. While Iran’s media framing was to make empty 
promises to the Shiʿis of Iraq in the distant future, Baʿthists were distributing material rewards 
among those who showed loyalty. And indeed, the Iraqi media framing and their policies, 
resonated more with the culture of the targeted audiences.  
Soon, the deadlock on the ground became apparent to the Iranians. Therefore, this time, 
Khomeini directly wrote a letter which, for days, was read out by VoTA. Although Khomeini 
addressed his letter to the ‘beloved Muslim people of Iraq’, its Shiʿi dimension was more 
evident than ever. Here is how he singles out and addresses the Shiʿi inhabitants of Basra, and 
of the two holy cities of Najaf and Karbala:  
 
Dear people of Iraq! Now that your brothers have come towards you 
and selflessly struggle to protect their country and save their dear 
brothers who are in bondage, rise up and, inspired by the great Islam, 
attack the enemies of Islam. Oh, devoted residents of Basra! Come to 
receive your believing brothers and sever the hands of infidel Aflaqi 
tyrants from your country. Oh, esteemed residents of the holy shrines! 
Take the opportunity God has provided for you and rise up courageously 
and determine your own destiny.14 
 
13 FBIS Daily Report, No. GF080821, VoTA, 9 July 1982. 
14 FBIS Daily Report, No. GF140701, VoTA, 14 July 1982. 
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Even this exceptional attempt by the spiritual Shiʿi leader failed to bear fruit, and Iraqis 
continued to strive to push back the Iranian aggression. By early 1983 it had become obvious 
to the Iranian leadership that their media strategy was futile in attracting the Shiʿi community 
in Iraq. 15 
As the fighting on the battleground was reaching a stalemate, the media contest lost its drive 
to achieve decisive influence and, instead, became entangled in repetitions of out-dated and 
tattered frames. While Iran had lost the opportunity to seize the upper hand on the battleground 
through media appeals to Iraqis which, it had hoped, would consolidate its foothold in Iraq and 
win the War, Iraq had pursued a well-calculated and centrally orchestrated media strategy and, 
thus, had won the contest.  
 
MEDIATISED SHIʿISM: STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL BARRIERS 
Three years after the war with Iran, and while the defeated Iraqi army was retreating from the 
Kuwait war, Shiʿis of the south erupted in one of the most menacing popular uprisings in the 
modern history of Iraq, later to be known as the 1991 uprising (Abdul-Jabar, 1992). In less than 
ten days, and with the Kurds joining the protest from the north, rebels had managed to gain 
control of fourteen out of Iraq’s eighteen provinces and were heading towards Baghdad 
(Tabarayian, 2012: 230). Although the central government eventually crushed the uprising and 
suppressed the threat, the 1991 uprising was the most threatening popular attempt to overthrow 
the rule of Saddam (Marr, 2012: 232). Some observers point out that President George H. W. 
Bush’s address to the Iraqis was crucial in prompting the uprising (Katzman, 2000). In a speech 
which was partly broadcasted to Iraqis after the Kuwait war, Bush stated, 
 
[there's] another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi 
military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and 
force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside, and then comply with 
the United Nations resolutions and rejoin the family of peace-loving 
nations. We have no argument with the people of Iraq. Our differences 
are with that brutal dictator in Baghdad.16 
 
15 Days later, Rafsanjani, Iran’s highest-ranking representative among the leadership in the Defence 
Council, wrote in his memoirs that ‘apparently the leader is extremely worried that his message did not 
mobilise Iraqis and lamented the poor media strategy for that’ (Hashemi Rafsanjani, 2001: 182).  
16 The full account of President George H.W. Bush statement is available at  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1991-book1/html/PPP-1991-book1-doc-pg148.htm 
[Accessed 01 April 2019]. 
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One may ask, what did President Bush say in his one address which achieved the widespread 
uprising that Iranian Shiʿi leaders had tried but failed to inspire during eight years of war with 
Iraq? How was it that Iran, which was the media authority between September 1981 and 
February 1983, lost the media contest to its Iraqi challengers?  
The Iranian leadership had attempted to promote two distinct messages, especially among 
the Shiʿis of Iraq, during the second phase of the war. The first was that Saddam and his Baʿthist 
supporters were brutal non-Muslims who, as agents of the world powers and Israel, were 
working against the interest of Islam. This was a most defiant message, and thus most 
worrisome for the Iraqi political apparatus. The second message was that the struggle against 
Saddam was a sacred and religious duty for all Muslims, no matter what the consequences. If 
they succeeded they would join their Iranian brethren who, under the leadership of Imam 
Khomeini, had prevailed against the regime of the Shah; if they were murdered, they would be 
martyrs and rewarded by God. In their media strategy, Iranians also strove to frame the war as 
an effort to fight against Saddam, to help Iraqis to get rid of him, and not to make them 
subservient to the Islamic Republic’s expansionist aspirations in the region.   
The difficulties the Iranians faced in transmitting these messages were both structural and 
cultural. The structural barriers for Iranians, as the media authority, were more noticeable. As 
table 2 indicates, after the 1979 Revolution, Iranian Arabic broadcasting situations changed 
dramatically, and their weekly hours dropped almost eight fold by the start of the war with Iraq 
in 1980. It took some time—almost the entire period of the second phase of the war when Iran 
had the upper hand on the battleground— for Iranians to increase their Arabic airtime. By the 
end of the war, the total Arabic-language hours per week was still less than in pre-Revolution 
Iran. On the other hand, Iranians lacked media skills when it came to regional and international 
broadcasting. Almost two-third of all VoTA records, documentd by FBIS between September 
1981 and February 1983 consisted of Arabic translations of Iranian official comments, their 
Friday sermons, and speeches by Ayatollah Khomeini delivered to domestic audiences. The 
Iranian Arabic media was poor and there was no central authority in place at the time. It took 
years for the multipolar power centres in post-Revolutionary Iran to form a coherent and 
pragmatic media strategy. In contrast, the Iraqi media was tightly controlled by the regime.   
Nonetheless, the most important lesson to take from this case study for the contemporary 
Middle East politics is Iran’s media cultural impediments to the mediatised Shiʿism during the 
war. Iranian leaders’ lack of understanding of the Iraqi Shiʿis, of their identity and loyalties, 
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and their underestimating of the agency of Iraqi Shiʿis were fairly high on their list of media 
strategy difficulties. These shortcomings offered the Iraqi regime a unique opportunity to 
effectively use media to frame the war, and to challenge the enemy’s propaganda.   
To challenge the Iranian diatribes against Saddam and the Baʿth regime, the Iraqi media 
initiated an orchestrated campaign to present him as the ‘Arab strongman’, a ‘pious Muslim’, 
and ‘the father of the nation’. Millions of copies of his photo, praying at Shiʿi holy shrines, 
pervaded the country. State TV stations were constantly showing him visiting shrines, meeting 
with families of soldiers, and distributing toys among Iraqi children (Abdul-Rahman, 2007). In 
one of their attempts, Iraqi regime produced a pedigree chart which linked Saddam to the first 
Shiʿi Imam. The copies of the chart were hung in every mosque and mausoleum across the 
country (see Figure 3 below). 
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Figure 3. A copy of Saddam's genealogical tree with the caption reading: 'from and Alid family, which 
its crown is Imam Ali, descnded Saddam Hussein'. 
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One of Iraqi media’s countermoves against that of Iran, was to construct newsworthy frames 
which linked the leaders of the revolution to Israel. In this, they not only managed to embolden 
pan-Arab sentiments among the public and the broader Arab world, but also to ridicule 
Khomeini’s spiritual authority among Shiʿis by portraying him as a ‘Zionist stooge’ (Karsh and 
Rautsi, 2002: 163) (see Figure 4 below).  
 
Figure 4. A copy of Khomeini’s cartoon published in Iraqi Alef-Ba Weekly during the war 
 
 
The most daunting cultural barrier for Iranian media strategy, nonetheless, was to communicate 
to the Shiʿi inhabitants of southern Iraq and Basra that Iranian forces were their liberator. In 
this, also, they miscalculated the very fundamental identity of Iraqi Shiʿis. It is noticeable, that 
in their media framing, Iranians failed to recognise ‘the exceptional collective Iraqi social 
character’, a concept coined by the pre-eminent Iraqi social scientist, Ali al-Wardi (Khoury, 
2018: 26). 
Al-Wardi opines that Iraqis, especially those Shiʿis residing in the lower Euphrates, 
showcase a ‘double personality’: a law-abiding urban citizen, and a Bedouin tribesman with a 
set of nomadic values (Al Hashimi, 2013: 254). Writing in the late 1960s, he argued that the 
idea of a modernised community was ‘superficial’ in cities, and even the modern accessories 
(for example modern clothing) used by Iraqis camouflaged the deeply tribal values among a 
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society which still was Bedouin at heart (Al-Wardi, 1974, Vol. IV: 402-3). The bedrock of this 
culture was to desire predominance and to repudiate submission. Values such as honour, 
loyalty, courage, and gallantry stood at the heart of Iraqi society (Khoury, 2013: 212). Material 
rewards and punishments had the utmost resonance for such a society (Al-Wardi, 2010: 251). 
This Bedouin culture was the key point which distinguished the Shiʿis of Iraq from their co-
religionist in Iran and elsewhere. Not recognising these cultural values in their framing not only 
caused predicaments for Iran during this period, but also offered a great opportunity for the 
Baʿth regime to challenge the enemy.   
Iranian leadership hoped to mobilise Iraqis against Saddam by assuring them that, if they 
succeeded in this ‘sacred struggle’, they would join the transnational movement of their Iranian 
brethren, and if they failed to do so, they would be martyrs and receive ‘God’s mercy’.17 Iran’s 
structural and cultural barriers, however, undermined its media strategy. The Iraqi media on 
the other hand promoted government ‘reward and punishment’ policies for loyal soldiers and 
for the ‘coward and betraying’ defectors. TV news was filled with footage of Saddam Hussein 
distributing medals to soldiers who fought valiantly against Iranian aggression.18 High 
performing officers in the military could receive Mercedes Benzes for their loyalty, and the 
families of fallen soldiers were compensated with money and a car (Razoux, 2015: 313, 
Blaydes, 2018: 101). On the other hand, as Saddam noted in one of his public addresses, ‘when 
soldiers no longer fight for the love of their leader, then they must fight by fear’ (Woods et al., 
2011a: 51). The Revolutionary Command Council decrees announcing that soldiers who desert 
their positions would be ‘executed immediately’ pervaded Iraqi radio broadcastings. The fear 
of the repercussions from the government— and promoted constantly by Iraqi media— 
mounted to the degree that later an army general suggested that the military campaign and 
public mobilisation revolved more around the ‘the fear of what Saddam might do than what 
Iranians might do’ (Woods et al., 2011a: 13). Contrasting Iran’s radio broadcasts during this 
period of the war to that of Iraq’s media strategy, demonstrates that the latter, as the challenger, 
had more success in promoting its political influence among the Shiʿis of Iraq.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Media contest theory suggests that to understand political conflict one should consider 
competition by political actors to use media to frame unfolding events to legitimise their rule 
 
17 FBIS Daily Report, No. GF080821, VoTA, 9 July 1982 
18 For a sample Iraqi national TV broadcasting see: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rs44HAdqAOY 
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and their policies (Cottle, 2006a: 13). Studying the case of the Iran-Iraq war during the period 
of 1982 to 1983 through the lens of media contest theory, this paper aimed to explain how the 
failure of Iran in mobilising the Shiʿis of Iraq stemmed, at least partly, from its defective media 
activities. 
The research presented here has two theoretical and empirical contributions. Most of the 
research that has applied media contest theory to case studies presents cases in which the media 
authority is a state facing weaker non-state challengers. This case study applies the theory to 
an explanation of the media contest between two sovereign states. Following Wolfsfeld’s 
original definition, it treated the more powerful antagonist as the media authority and the 
weaker antagonist as the challenger (Wolfsfeld, 1997: 3). It showed that, during the course of 
the Iran-Iraq war, and as the politics on the battleground were changing, both Iran and Iraq 
became authority and challenger in different phases of the war. A second theoretical 
contribution has been to use qualitative methods to explain the cultural dimension of the contest 
rather than, as is more common, a quantitative analysis of frames.  
The application of media contest theory to the case of the Iran-Iraq war also provides 
important empirical insight into the contemporary politics of the Middle East, and the early 
stages of transnational mediatised Shiʿis which we witness today in the region. This insight 
concerns, first, the role of political communication in regional politics, and second, the socio-
political role of the Islamic Republic within the broader Shiʿi world. Although political 
communication as a field has changed dramatically in the last four decades, studying the role 
of radio broadcasts during the Iran-Iraq war resonates with the current media-saturated era. The 
role that Arabic radio broadcasting played for Iranians during the war is significantly similar 
to their regional media strategies today. The conflict also marked the turning point for the shift 
to what could be called as mediatised Shiʿism, and this paper portrayed how Iran, for its part, 
failed to conduct it. Acknowledging the role of media in its regional policies and soft power 
today, Iran has one official Arabic news TV channel (al-Alam), one Arabic religious and 
cultural TV channel (al-Kawthar), and one Arabic movie and entertainment channel (iFilm in 
Arabic), along with numerous Arabic radio stations and social media.19 A potential area for 
future study is to explore how Iran’s media strategy targeting the Arab public in the Middle 
East, and mediatisation of Shiʿi Islam, has evolved in the aftermath of the war, and especially 
 
19 See the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) official website available at 
https://www.irib.ir [Accessed 7 June 2019].  
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in the period following the 2003 Iraq war. This would shed further light on the broader regional 
policy of Iran which has been built up on the experiences of the war with Iraq.  
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